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ABSTRACT

As the Bolsheviks attempted to assert their control over the territory of the
Russian Empire during the chaotic years of the Russian Civil War many ethnic groups
and nations formerly part of the empire declared their independence. Józef Piłsudski as
the leader of the Second Polish Republic implemented a strategy called Prometheanism
that sought to secure Poland’s newly won independence by helping neighboring nations,
such as Ukraine, break away from Russian control. Promethean ideas survived the
destruction of the Polish state in 1939 when Poles with ties to Piłsudski or
Prometheanism who fled to the West after the start of war continued their work in foreign
lands. These Polish expatriates influenced the foreign policy of both post-communist
Polish foreign policy and of the United States.
A study of Prometheanism is important for several reasons. The most obvious is
that it helps explain some of the geopolitical and strategic currents at work in the Eurasia
today, in particular Eastern Europe. A closer study of Prometheanism helps to highlight
the importance of immigration in shaping policy, as well as showing some of the positive
and negative aspects of liberal immigration and refugee policies for both the source and
destination countries.
The purpose of this paper is to show how Polish émigrés kept the principles of
Prometheanism alive in exile. This study shows that Prometheanism is not an obscure
policy of a failed state but rather an important idea whose influence can still be seen
iv

today. Additionally, the paper will examine the role of émigrés and immigrants in the
formation of a state’s foreign policy and how they bring different experiences and
perspectives that influence the host country in both positive and negative manners. The
paper will first cover the origins of Prometheanism and its implementation under
Piłsudski. Then it will discuss the editor and writers of Kultura who adapted the
principles of Prometheanism to Poland’s post war reality and how this new vision played
an important role in shaping Poland’s foreign policy after 1989. Finally, the paper will
show how Polish Americans lobbied for the United States to adopt policies towards the
Soviet Union and Russia that bear a striking similarity to Prometheanism.
The paper will deal with what scholars of immigration history call the
“Transatlantic exchange.” This concept sees immigration as a two way exchange of ideas
and culture rather than a one way flow of people. From 1945 to 1989 only in other
countries could Poles think about Poland’s foreign policy and place in the world. Some of
these Polish émigrés focused their thinking on what Poland should do to restore its
independence. Others used their experiences in Poland to help inform the foreign policies
of their host nations. Their example shows what impact immigrant groups have on their
host country; in this case how highly educated Polish Americans influenced the United
States.
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CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS AND ACTIVITY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
In November of 1918, Józef Piłsudski accomplished his lifelong goal of seeing
Poland restored as an independent country. Poland managed to free itself after over a
hundred years of foreign occupation because of the collapse of the Russian, German, and
Austro-Hungarian Empires after World War I. Due to his role as the creator and leader of
Polish military formations during the war, he became the head of state of the newly
independent Second Polish Republic. In this new capacity he faced the serious problem
of how to maintain Poland’s sovereignty.
Even though Poland was very weak in 1918–1920, so were its neighbors. Russia’s
weakness in particular represented an opportunity for Piłsudski to ensure the survival of
the Polish state. After the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917, the Russian Empire
collapsed and the country fell into a state of anarchy and civil war. In this chaotic
environment, several nations broke away from Russian control and formed independent
states such as, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Other nations that once
made up parts of the Russian Empire also attempted to break away during the civil war
but only temporarily severed themselves from Moscow’s grip. Examples of these
temporarily free nations include Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Mountain
Republic in the Caucasus, the Don Republic, the Kuban People’s Republic, Basmachi,
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Bukhara, and Khiva. 1 In addition to these, there were other active national separatist
movements in regions such as Crimea and Tatarstan.
The chaotic situation in Russia presented an opportunity for Poland to consolidate
its independence and then strengthen its position. If Poland’s eastern neighbors were a
series of smaller states rather than a unified Russian Empire or a consolidated Soviet
Union, then the risks to Poland would be greatly diminished. Piłsudski understood this
and therefore sponsored a movement called Prometheanism. This program aimed to
promote nationalist movements inside the Soviet Union that would lead to the creation of
several independent states in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Piłsudski’s
often quoted statement that “there can be no independent Poland without an independent
Ukraine” is a good indication of the logic behind Prometheanism. 2 In other words,
without an independent Ukraine, Poland positioned between Russia and Germany would
not have the strength to preserve its independence on its own. Piłsudski hoped these
states would serve to secure Poland’s freshly won independence. Much like Moscow
used communist parties in the West to serve its own interests, Poland’s sponsorship of the
nationalists movements in the USSR were meant to help serve Poland’s interests. 3
Piłsudski promoted Prometheanism in inter-war Poland, but the roots of the
strategy have long been part of Polish thinking. The idea that Poland needs to cooperate
and ally with its eastern neighbors in order survive dates back to the fourteenth century.

1

See Figures 1 through 4 in Appendix A.
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Piłsudski made this statement during talks with Ukrainian leaders leading up to the signing of the Treaty
of Warsaw and the creation of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance. Quote in: Roman Wolczuk, Ukraine’s
Foreign and Security Policy 1991-2000 (New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003), 73.
3

Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 40.
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In those days the Teutonic Knights, an expansionist crusading order located in Prussia,
threatened Poland’s existence. In 1385, Poland signed the Treaty of Krewo with the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila, later known as King
Władysław II Jagiello, agreed to convert to Christianity and marry the ruling Queen of
Poland, Jadwiga. Thus began the Jagiellonian dynasty, which ruled both Poland and
Lithuania until 1572 by which time the two states had formed an even closer union. The
idea of Prometheanism ultimately stems from the multi-ethnic state created by this
dynastic union.
Polish artists and writers also used Promethean imagery during the Partition era.
The name of Prometheanism comes from the Greek myth of Prometheus. In Polish
literature Prometheus came to symbolize enlightenment and resistance to tyranny.
Several of Piłsudski’s favorite authors wrote stories that featured characters based off of
Prometheus, including Juliusz Słowacki, Adam Mickiewicz, Stefan Żeromski and Jan
Kasprowicz. During the nineteenth century, several Polish independence activists called
for the breakup of the Russian empire along ethnic lines. 4 Literature’s strong influence on
Prometheanism led Stalin to charge and later execute dissident Crimean and Tatar
nationalist leaders for the crime of “Wallenrodism,” named after a fictional character in
Adam Mickiewicz’s poem, Konrad Wallenrod. 5 The poem glamorized patriotic treason
and featured an ethnically Lithuanian member of the Teutonic Knights who betrayed
them after learning of his true heritage. The poem helped to inspire the 1830 revolt in

4

Serhiy Bilenky, Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political
Imaginations (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012),
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=879037, 58.
Edmund Charaszkiewicz et al., Zbiór Dokumentów Ppłk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (Krakow: Fundacja
CDCN, 2000), 65.
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Poland. 6 One of the most popular novels in Poland during the partition era, With Fire and
Sword (Ogniem i Mieczem), discussed the tragedies that befell both Poland and Ukraine
due to their feuding. The novel, set during the seventeenth century Khmelnytsky
Uprising, ends with this passage, “The Commonwealth became a desert; a desert the
Ukraine. Wolves howled on the ruins of former towns, and a land once flourishing
became a graveyard. Hatred grew into the hearts and poisoned the blood of brothers.” 7
The culture and literary tradition that Piłsudski lived in helped him understand the need
for Polish-Ukrainian cooperation against their common enemies.
Piłsudski attempted to breakup the Russian Empire along ethnic lines even before
he took control of an independent Polish state. A military intelligence officer who wrote
about his experiences in the movement, Edmund Charaszkiewicz, stated Prometheanism
sprang forth from the mind of Joseph Piłsudski when he first formulated his ideas in a
letter he wrote in 1904 to the Japanese government. In his letter, he asked for aid from
Japan and in return would attack Russian forces thereby causing the Russians to have to
fight a two front war in the Russo-Japanese War. He informed the Japanese that Russia,
stripped of its control over other nations, would cease to be a dangerous neighbor. 8 He
even traveled to Japan and attempted to present his ideas in person. 9

6

Christopher John Murray, ed., Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, 1760-1850 (New York: Fitzroy
Dearborn, 2004),
http://books.google.com/books?id=wgS2nYRIuUEC&pg=PA740&dq=Konrad+Wallenrod&cd=19#v=one
page&q=Konrad%20Wallenrod&f=false, 740.

7

Henryk Sienkiewicz, With Fire and Sword: A Historical Novel of Poland and Russia, trans. Jeremiah
Curtin, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1894), 776.

8

Charaszkiewicz, Zbiór Dokumentów, 56.

There he was foiled by Roman Dmowski who travelled to Japan to stop Piłsudski. Nothing material came
of Piłsudski’s trip however it is still significant because for the first time in nearly a century a government
recognized Polish leaders as representatives of their country.

9
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Through Prometheanism, Piłsudski sought to destabilize and destroy the Soviet
Union by fostering nationalism in its constituent republics and ethnic minorities. After
Poland’s independence, Piłsudski attempted to capitalize on the Soviet Union’s troubles
and detach non-Russian areas from Moscow’s control in several ways. He attempted this
overtly during the Polish-Soviet War when Poland joined forces with Symon Petlura and
his temporarily independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. Their forces took Kyiv in an
attempt to ensure Ukraine’s freedom from Moscow’s control. During the Russian Civil
War Poland also recognized the independence of Georgia and Armenia. 10 After the
Soviet government managed to reassert control Poland had to continue its Promethean
efforts covertly. The governments-in-exile of Ukraine and Tatarstan based themselves in
Poland. 11 Prometheanism included helping these various nationalist groups get in contact
with each other in order to coordinate their efforts. 12 Poland devoted funds to help exiled
nationalists start publications and there were also covert efforts inside the Soviet Union to
spread propaganda and nationalist literature. 13 Pilsudski’s vision called for nations, such
as Ukraine and Belarus to be incorporated into a multi-national federation. 14
Piłsudski entrusted the work of Prometheanism to a network of friends and
subordinates, in keeping with his manner of governing. It was “never an official policy of
any Polish government, and had no support from Polish political parties, who were never
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See Figures 6 through 7 in Appendix A.
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Charaszkiewicz, Zbiór Dokumentów, 62.
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Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 41-42.
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Alexandros Petersen, “Chapter 4: Prometheism,” in The World Island: Eurasian Geoplitics and the Fate
of the West, Kindle Edition (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International, 2011).
14

Richard K. Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1992
(Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 59.
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consulted.” 15 His chosen agents carried out the policy and coordinated their efforts
secretly. The men and women in the movement were veterans of the Polish struggle for
independence. Many were from aristocratic families and born inside Russia but outside of
Congress Poland. In other words, those chosen by Piłsudski to help organize
Prometheanism largely grew up around the people they later worked with to help liberate.
Prometheanism spanned the length and breadth of Eurasia. Piłsudski’s agents
established offices as far afield as Ankara, Turkey and Harbin, Manchuria. Poland also
manned branches in Finland. Aid to the Caucasus came from the Polish embassy in
Tehran. Caucasian officers were recruited into the Polish military. Poles developed proindependence literature for peoples in Idel-Ural (i.e. Tatarstan), Crimea, and Central
Asia. 16 The briefly independent government in Crimea even asked to be placed under a
Polish Mandate by the League of Nations. 17 Poland helped Said Shamil, grandson of
Imam Shamil, steer the 1931 World Moslem Congress against the Soviet Union. This led
to a lot of negative press for the Soviets in Islamic publications. 18 Said Shamil helped to
found the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, a briefly independent state
from 1917—1920. Poland also hosted the remnants of this government after Piłsudski
came to power in 1926. 19
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Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 41.
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Petersen, The World Island, “Chapter 4: Prometheism.”
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“Warsaw Diet in Uproar: Socialists Prevent Vote on Proposal to Create a Senate,” The New York Times,
November 7, 1920.
18

Charaszkiewicz, Zbiór Dokumentów, 65; Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim
Congresses (New Haven: Columbia University Press, 1986), 132.
19

Zeynel Abidin Besleney, The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey: A Political History (New York:
Routledge, 2014),
https://books.google.com/books?id=zQEkAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT136&lpg=PT136&dq=%22Said+Shamil%
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While Prometheans worked with many different groups, the main focus of the
movement’s efforts centered on Soviet Ukraine. This happened for several reasons.
Ukrainians were by far the largest of the non-Russian ethnic groups inside the USSR and
many Ukrainians did not want to be ruled by Moscow. Additionally it bordered Poland
and many Poles lived side by side with Ukrainians. Indeed, “Poland… placed particular
hopes in Soviet Ukraine.” 20 After the Treaty of Riga, Poland continued to covertly aid the
Ukrainian People’s Republic. It helped to organize Ukraine’s military staff, including an
intelligence section. Poland recruited Petlurist Ukrainian officers into its own armed
forces. Aid also went into supporting pro-independence publications and academic
research.
Prometheanism had a domestic component as well. The Volhynia Experiment
represented Piłsudski's attempt to utilize Ukrainian nationalism to the benefit of the
Polish state internally. Volhynia was an eastern region of Poland and ethnically the most
Ukrainian, with Ukrainians consisting of around ninety percent of the population. The
governor of Volhynia, Henryk Józewski, believed that support for Ukrainian culture
would weaken the Soviet Union and prevent the Soviet Union from using Poland's ethnic
minorities from rising up and weakening the Polish state. In addition to allowing
Ukrainian to be used in schools, he also sponsored the creation of the Polish Orthodox
Church and got its independence recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople. This
allowed Poland’s Ukrainian orthodox believers to use Ukrainian in sermons and have a

22+poland&source=bl&ots=xIvrYk3B6m&sig=uqKiQznfzfkgFWGLfZgQnml3OFg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=eP
yxVN3IDYW1ogTw54LACg&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Said%20Shamil&f=false, 88-89.
20

Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, xviii.
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religious leader independent of Moscow. 21 The Volhynia Experiment is an important part
of the overall history of the Prometheanism. Józewski closely collaborated with many of
the writers and thinkers who would later carry on the ideals of Prometheanism after
World War II. 22
Groups in Poland, such as the National Democrats, did not support
Prometheanism. After Piłsudski temporarily left power in 1920, the Polish government
decided to stop funding the Ukrainian government of Symon Petlura in 1923. The Polish
foreign ministry then instructed its embassies to observe and report Ukrainian
dispositions but no longer to provide aid to Ukrainian nationalists in exile. However,
Piłsudski’s allies in the foreign ministry continued to do what they could to help keep
Prometheanism alive. After Piłsudski’s coup in 1926 restored him to power, Promethean
activity picked up again. Under his guidance, Polish aid to the cause of Prometheanism
reached its zenith.
Poland did not aid these nationalist groups singlehandedly. Other countries tried
to accomplish similar goals as well. For example, the British supported revolts in the
Caucasus against Imperial Russia in the nineteenth century. France and the United
Kingdom helped the same nationalist movements that Poland supported as well. Poland
did not exclusively promote revolts inside Russia and the Soviet Union but did take the
lead in supporting non-Russian nationalism in the interwar era and Poland did make the
longest and most consistent effort to break up the Soviet Union prior to World War II.

21

Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 149-150.

22

Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 250.
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However, Germany actually provided the most military help to Ukrainian
nationalists. The Germans in the later years of World War I set up a Ukrainian puppet
state that they hoped to economically exploit. In 1917–18, the German military exploited
their Ukrainian puppet state so badly that, “The peasantry, who had at first eschewed
Bolshevism, now turned to it as a protection against the exploitation and repressive
domination of the Central Powers.” 23 This shows that westerners, including Poles, do not
offer their support for selfless reasons and that their help is often costly for Ukrainians
and others.
Polish efforts to free captive nations differed in key ways from the policies of
other nations. Unlike efforts such as the German support for Ukraine towards the end of
World War I, Poland carried out its Promethean efforts covertly effort and did not
publicly proclaimed them. Poland did not enact the movement as a last ditch effort to
garner support for in a war nor as a temporary measure to help recruitment efforts. Rather
Poland sustained the effort for over twenty years, spanning periods of war and peace. 24
Poland attempted to foster Ukrainian nationalism but at the same time gave
Ukrainian nationalists reasons to be angry at Poland. The Polish seizure of key cities that
Lithuanians and Ukrainians believed belonged to them resulted in conflict between
Poland and those nations prior and became one of the biggest stumbling blocks in
Poland’s relationship with both of those nations. In 1918–1919, Poland fought a brief war
with the Ukrainian National Republic and seized the city of Lviv. In 1920, Piłsudski’s
23

Germany was not alone in exploiting Ukraine. Ukrainian peasants hated Polish landowners this legacy
of exploitation hurt efforts at cooperation between Poland and Ukraine; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, BrestLitovsk the Forgotten Peace (London: Macmillan and CO., 1938),
http://archive.org/stream/brestlitovskthef018745mbp/brestlitovskthef018745mbp_djvu.txt.
24

Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 40-41.
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forces seized Vilnius. Because of this action, “Lithuanian resentment of Poland ran very
deep and Lithuanians have only recently (early years of the 21st century) begun showing
signs of understanding Polish aims and motives in 1920.” 25 These conflicting efforts led
to the failure of Prometheanism in Piłsudski’s lifetime.
Józewski’s attempt to promote Ukrainian nationalism backfired. The Volhynia
experiment neither tied Poland’s Ukrainian minority to the Polish state, nor did it result in
Ukrainian goodwill. It did not lead to reconciliation between Polish and Ukrainian
nationalists. 26 Neither Polish nor Ukrainian nationalists viewed the Volhynia Experiment
in a positive light. “Soviet historians justified the Soviet annexation of Volhynia by
portraying interwar Polish policy as the exploitation of the honest Ukrainian peasant.
Much Ukrainian historiography has followed this line, and few Ukrainian national
historians have shown much patience for Polish compromisers such as Józewski.” 27
Ukrainian nationalists ethnically cleansing the eastern regions of inter-war Poland. In
World War II, the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (UPA) under Stepan Bandera
“murdered 40,000-60,000 Poles living in the villages of former Volhynia and former East
Galicia, while the Poles killed some 20,000 Ukrainians, mostly in former East Galicia in
reprisal.” 28 Later, after the war, the Polish government ethnically cleansed south eastern

25

Anna M. Cienciala, “The Rebirth of Poland,” History 557 Lecture Notes, Spring 2012,
http://acienciala.faculty.ku.edu/hist557/lect11.htm.
Tadeusz Hołówko one of the main ideologues of Prometheanism and a supporter of Ukrainian culture in
Poland was assassinated by Ukrainian nationalists.
26

27

Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, xv.

28

Cienciala, “The Rebirth of Poland.”
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Poland of tens of thousands of Ukrainians. 29 Therefore, Prometheanism did not lead to
better relations between the two nations. It actually led to disastrous results.
By the 1950s, it would seem that Prometheanism had failed and faded into
obscurity. The project did not lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union. After World War
II, the People’s Republic of Poland did not adopt Piłsudski’s geopolitical plan. Fears of
renewed German aggression and Soviet occupation prevented the implementation of
Piłsudski’s ideals and methods. Communist Poland discarded Piłsudski’s vision of Polish
nationalism and its relationship with Poland’s interwar minorities and instead
implemented Roman Dmowski’s version of Polish nationality based on ethnicity rather
than loyalty to the state.

29

Cienciala, “The Rebirth of Poland.”
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CHAPTER 2: SURVIVAL AND TRANSFORMATION

Yet while the Second Polish Republic no longer existed by the 1940s
Prometheanism did not die with it. Promethean ideas survived the destruction of the
Polish state when many of the people with ties to Piłsudski or Prometheanism fled to the
West after the war. The idea that Poland should help promote nationalism in and the
independence of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union continued and spread in the
writing of Polish émigrés living in Western Europe and the United States, particularly in
the journal Kultura. The grand strategy laid out in the pages of Kultura featured an
updated version of Prometheanism which stated that Poland should treat Lithuania,
Belarus, and Ukraine as nations on an equal footing with Poland and Russia, help them
achieve independence, and to drop all territorial claims on their land. When Poland did
restore its full independence in 1989, Poland carried out this program of promoting the
independence of these three nations. Later as Poland’s position improved and it became
part of NATO and the EU, its ambition increased and Poland began to incorporate more
elements of Prometheanism, namely the independence of nations farther afield such as
Georgia and Chechnya. Prometheanism failed to preserve the Second Polish Republic but
the program’s influence continued after World War II.
Jerzy Giedroyc, as editor of Kultura, modernized Piłsudski’s ideas and adapted
them to the situation Poland found itself in after World War II. After the war he settled
down near Paris, so Kultura is known as Kultura paryska, which means Parisian. His
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journal called for a Polish foreign policy that would help promote the independence of its
eastern neighbors much like the agenda for Piłsudski’s Prometheanism. It is mainly
through Giedroyc that Prometheanism, although a modified version of it, still occupies an
influential place with Polish foreign policy.
Post-communist Polish foreign policy largely derived from the thinking of
Giedroyc and his team of Polish exiles writing in the journal Kultura. His importance to
Polish thinking about its eastern neighbors has been shown by historians such as Timothy
Snyder. 30 His influence on Poland is such that both UNESCO and the Polish Sejm
declared 2006, the 100th anniversary of his birth, to be “The Year of Jerzy Giedroyc.” 31
That Sejm resolution listed his accomplishments and his influence on post-1989 Poland.
Notably, the resolution also mentioned events that occurred after his death, such as the
Ukrainian Orange Revolution. It stated that, “The breakthrough achieved in PolishUkrainian relations during the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Kiev and the reactions of Poles to
the Ukrainian struggle for the right to self-determination and democratic elections
number among the Editor's [Giedroyc’s] real and most resounding victories.” 32 The
resolution thereby recognizes the continuing importance of Giedroyc’s ideas even after
his death.

30

Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 218.
31

“The Year of Jerzy Giedroyc in 2006,” Culture.pl, December 27, 2007, http://culture.pl/en/event/theyear-of-jerzy-giedroyc-in-2006; “Proposals by Member States For the Celebration of Anniversaries in
2006-2007 With Which UNESCO Could Be Associated,” Unesco.org, October 6, 2005,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001411/141144e.pdf.
32

“The Year Of Jerzy Giedroyc - Resolution of the Sejm,” Culture.pl, May 5, 2014,
http://culture.pl/en/article/the-year-of-jerzy-giedroyc-resolution-of-the-sejm.
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There are several lines of continuity between Piłsudski’s designs and Giedroyc’s
thought. Both men came from noble families were born into noble families east of
modern Poland’s borders where the nearby peasants spoke a language other than Polish.
Piłsudski was born in a village in Lithuania and grew up in Vilnius while Giedroyc was
born in Minsk. Piłsudski went to university in Kharkiv, which at the time was part of the
Russian Empire but is today Ukraine’s second largest city. Giedroyc studied law and
Ukrainian history in Warsaw. Therefore both men learned about Ukrainian issues as part
of their formal education. After the Polish-Soviet war, Giedroyc became a political ally
of Piłsudski and opposed the National Democrats who handed his hometown of Minsk
over to the Bolsheviks in the Treaty of Riga. 33 During Piłsudski’s May 1926 coup
Giedroyc initially supported the government against the rebels but seeing the
government’s disorder and chaotic response “deepened his pro-Piłsudski stance.” 34
Not only did Giedroyc support Piłsudski, he participated the Promethean
movement. Historian Timothy Snyder described Giedroyc during the interwar years as a
“central if discreet figure of the Prometheanism of the early 1930s.” 35 During this time he
edited a magazine called Myśl Mocarstwowa that opposed National Democrats’ vision of
Poland as an ethnic state. Rather his publications supported the Jagiellon tradition 36 of

33

They did this to reduce the number of ethnic minorities inside Poland’s borders. See Snyder, The
Reconstruction of Nations, 68.
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Quoted from Giedroyc’s autobiography on the Kultura Paryska website; Phillip T. Turner, trans., “Jerzy
Giedroyc Biografia najkrótsza,” Kultura Paryska, accessed January 9, 2015,
http://kulturaparyska.com/ludzie/pokaz/g/jerzy-giedroyc.
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Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 250.

Later Polish nationalists and supporters of Prometheanism tried to uphold then legacy and ideals of the
Jagiellonian dynasty. This ideal of Poland is known as the Jagiellonian Concept. The opposing ideal is
known as the Piast Concept which draws its name from an earlier Polish dynasty. The Piast Concept
stresses ties to Western Europe and Polish ethnicity as the basis for the Polish state. The conflict between
these two viewpoints caused much of Piłsudski’s domestic political struggles. He represented the
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Poland as multi-ethnic state that tolerated many religions. His magazine attempted to
popularize Prometheanism. 37 He befriended several leading Ukrainian nationalists and
supported Piłsudski’s efforts to free Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia and the other
Caucasian nations from Soviet rule. 38 After World War II he managed to reunite several
of the leading Prometheans in the pages of Kultura. 39
Historians of the subject note the continuity of Prometheanism inside the pages of
Kultura. Timothy Synder wrote that the “underlying logic of the Kultura eastern program
was the same as that of interwar Polish Prometheanism.” 40 In his thesis about Poland’s
role in shaping EU eastern policy, Andreas Lorek wrote about Prometheanism, Kultura
and Polish foreign policy after 1989. He described the “realistic” proposals of the
National Democrats versus the Prometheanism and those who carried on its traditions
after 1945:
The second school of thought was called the “Promethean” doctrine. This
approach originated at the beginning of the twentieth-century under Marshal Józef
Piłsudski, “the father of Polish independence.” It followed the argumentation that
Poland’s security must be based on the independence of the neighbouring states
Lithuania, Belarus and especially Ukraine, eventually with a confederation
between these states. During the time of the Cold war, representatives of the
“realistic” ideas were the authorities of the Polish People Republic, the writers of

Jagiellonian Concept while his opponents the National Democrats, led by Roman Dmowski, held to the
Piast Concept. The debate over these concepts extended into the post-1945 era because the Polish
Communist government claimed that the “Reclaimed territories,” in western Poland belonged to Poland
under the Piast dynasty.
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the Parisian journal “Kultura” [sic] developed and promoted the “Promethean”
ideas. 41
Therefore, historians of Polish foreign policy and of the region have noted that the
principles of Prometheanism were the basis on which Kultura’s writings on what
Poland’s relationship with its eastern neighbors should be like.
Indeed, sometimes the connections between Prometheanism and Kultura were
explicitly stated. In a 1952 article for the journal Kultura Włodzimierz Bączkowski cited
an earlier work of his that stated the underlying logic of Prometheanism well. He wrote
that even if the Ukrainian nation did not yet exist, Poland’s national interest mandated
aiding Ukrainian nationalists develop one simply so that Poland would not have to face
ninety million Great Russians plus forty million Little Russians.42 He also argued that an
independent Ukraine would naturally desire to expand eastwards into the Donbas rather
than westward into Poland. This would bring them into conflict with the Russians who
need access to the Black Sea. 43 Based on these arguments it is clear that an independent
Ukraine would push the borders of Russia away from Poland and thereby relieve Poland
of the necessity to guard against two hostile neighbors, Germany and Russia.
Giedroyc and the Kultura writers advocated for Poland to treat Lithuanian,
Belarus and Ukraine as nations and to renounce claims on their territories. This sort of
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policy would make Poland an ally rather than an enemy of those nationalities.
Nationalists in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine would then only have Moscow as an
enemy. Giedroyc’s main partner in spelling out Poland’s future eastern policy was Juliusz
Mieroszewski. According to Mieroszewski “Poland’s security and freedom were
ultimately tied to its ability to come to terms with its eastern neighbors… Mieroszewski
was convinced that Poles would have to abandon the hate-cum-contempt attitude toward
their eastern neighbors that has long been a part of their national ethos. Poland had to
accept the loss of the kresy [the eastern borderlands] as the price to be paid for normal
relations with Ukraine, Belarussia, and Lithuania.” 44 They believed that Poland’s first
priority in its eastern strategy should be the support for the independence of its eastern
neighbors, in particular Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, precisely the core idea of
Prometheanism.
The idea of treating Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine as legitimate nations that
were the equals of Poland and Russia was revolutionary at the time. They had not
enjoyed independence for hundreds of years. In fact, Mieroszewski devoted a lot of space
to denouncing Poland’s imperialistic attitude to its eastern neighbors. For example, he
wrote: “Has our imperialist impulse died out? ... I do not think so. Many Poles not only
wish for a Polish Lwów and Vilnius, they even dream of a Polish Minsk and Kyiv. Many
idealize the idea of an independent Poland in a federation alongside Lithuania, Ukraine,
and Belarus. In other words, the alternative to a Russian empire can only be a Polish
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empire.” 45 Speaking about Jagiellon tradition and how those east of Poland viewed it,
“Only for us does the Jagiellon tradition carry no trace of imperialism. However, for
Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians it is the traditional form of Polish
imperialism.” 46 He repeatedly stressed that Poland should drop all its eastern territorial
claims, “We cannot say that the Russians should give Kyiv back to the Ukrainians and at
the same time say that Lwów must go back to Poland.” 47 For Mieroszewski the only way
to come to an understanding with the Russians that would preserve Poland’s
independence would be to recognize that Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine have an equal
right to independence as Poland. 48
Giedroyc monitored the development of Ukrainian identity and nationalism and
worried when it looked like the Ukrainian language was dying. In 1961, he wrote to
Zbigniew Brzezinski about his travels in Kazakhstan and his interactions with Ukrainian
farmers who had moved near to Alma-Ata. He expressed his worry that the Ukrainians
who settled there would lose their distinctive culture and noted that the increasing use of
Russian worried him. In Ukraine, Giedroyc found that only in Lviv did people still speak
Ukrainian widely, and only there could he still find signs of Ukrainian nationalism, albeit
of an anti-Polish strain. Overall, he wrote about the situation in Lviv favorably and
compared it well to “the state of things in Kiev and also in Kharkiv, where the Ukrainians
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are losing ground.” 49 This letter shows how highly Giedroyc valued Ukrainian
nationalism and cultural distinctiveness from Russia.
The Kultura program placed such a high priority on the independence of
Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine because they would help Poland maintain its own
independence. Mieroszewski wrote that without the presence of these nations Poland
would be in a hopeless position, “Imagine for example that Russia is a nation-state.
Populated from Vladivostok to Lwów by one mass of Russians. In this example Poland’s
situation would be hopeless… Luckily this is not the case… Our only hope is to unite
with those—who like us—want to free themselves and stand on their own two feet.” 50
For Mieroszewski Poland’s only hope of being able to fend off the Russians is good
relations with the nations between Poland and Russia, “We are not choosing between a
promethean program and a program of conversation with the Soviets, of course we do not
have such a choice. We advocate for a program of liberation of nations subjugated by
Russia—not because of any romantic notions but because, there is no other alternative
and in fact never was.” 51 This statement shows how thinking about Poland’s eastern
neighbors began to evolve. Kultura moved away from the Jagiellon view of Ukraine and
Belarus and moving towards viewing them as equals. This represented a reformed
version of Prometheanism’s drive to secure their independence.
In 1989 democratic elections took place in Poland. They led to the fall of
communism and left Poland free to conduct an independent foreign policy for two years
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while the Soviet Union still existed. During this time Poland had to navigate a
complicated and rapidly changing world. Germany had still not unified. German
unification posed a serious problem for Poland because West Germany had never agreed
to Poland’s western borders. To the east the Soviet Union still commanded powerful
conventional and nuclear forces. Poland had to secure its borders and define its
relationship with its neighbors. Rather than stumble through these potential minefields,
Poland’s leaders acted with a plan. Post-communist Poland’s strategic goals had already
been laid out in the pages of Kultura.
After the fall of communism in Poland, the Polish government moved swiftly and
deliberately to help eastern nations also achieve their independence while not
antagonizing Moscow and helping to manage German reunification. Their deliberate and
speedy response to events indicates that Poles were acting on a pre-existing plan rather
just successfully making up grand strategy as they went along. Mieroszewski wrote that,
“The first priority for Poland’s eastern policy should be the recognition of the rights of
nations oppressed by the Soviets to self-determination and independence… in particular
Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania.” 52 Giedroyc wrote in his autobiography that, “Our main
goal should be normalizing relationships with Russia and Germany, exerted together with
defense of the independence of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, and with a close
cooperation with them. We should realise that the stronger our position in the East is, the
more we mean in the West.” 53 In 1989–1991, non-Communist Poland did its best to
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follow their advice while managing the withdrawal of Soviet troops, German unification
and the eventual Polish integration into NATO and the EU.
Poland’s response to the Lithuanian independence movement shows the care that
Poland took with its foreign relations in this era. Poland was one of the first states to
support Lithuania’s exit from the Soviet Union. On March 11, 1990 the Supreme Soviet
of the Lithuanian SSR adopted the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania.
The next day, Polish leaders sent congratulations to Lithuania. Lech Wałęsa issued a
statement that declared, “The Government of the Polish Republic supports selfdetermination of nations, including self-determination leading to separate statehood…
Poles are interested in good relations with the nation of Lithuania as well as with all our
neighbors… I would like to express my delight that Lithuanian independence has been
restored.” 54 That same day Polish Solidarity officials traveled to Vilnius and Kyiv and
addressed nationalist assemblies and the Lithuanian Parliament. 55 Wałęsa’s statement
called Lithuania a nation. This not only shows that Poland worked towards helping its
eastern neighbors declare independence but that Polish leaders now viewed their
neighbors as equals. This represented an important achievement of the Kultura program
and a significant improvement over the efforts to promote nationalist movements during
Piłsudski’s lifetime when chauvinistic Polish attitudes towards Ukrainian, Lithuanian,
and Belarusian national aspirations hampered such efforts.
Surprisingly in hindsight, when Lithuania became the first Soviet Republic to
declare independence the international community did not support the breakup of the

54

John Kifner, “Poland’s Leaders Praise Lithuanian Sovereignty,” The New York Times, March 12, 1990.

55

Kifner, “Poland’s Leaders Praise Lithuanian Sovereignty.”

22
Soviet Union. Poland’s support of Lithuania leaving the USSR was not an easy decision.
However, as Lithuania moved to free itself from the Soviet Union, Poland cautiously but
consistently supported its efforts, short of formal recognition. Poland’s caution made
sense because Soviet forces still occupied Poland at the time. However, despite its
caution Poland still supported Lithuania independence far ahead of most other countries.
Poland sent a letter of congratulations and recognized Lithuanian independence before all
other Eastern European states. In contrast to Poland’s stance, in March of 1991, a full
year after Wałęsa celebrated Lithuania’s potential independence, after the Soviet
economic blockade against Lithuania and the use of force against the republic’s
parliament, President Bush’s White House softened its tone against Gorbachev and
“made it clear that it was not prepared to take Lithuania’s side in a test of will with
Moscow.” 56 The United States did not recognize Lithuanian independence until
September 1991 even though according to the State Department’s Office of the Historian,
the US never recognized Lithuania’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. 57
Kultura played an important role in guiding Poland to support Lithuania. Jerzy
Giedroyc and the writers he featured called for and supported Poland’s role in the
encouragement of Lithuania’s contribution to the breakup of the USSR. The journal
featured articles that promoted the importance of Lithuanian independence for Poland for
years prior to 1990. Giedroyc personally called for the Polish government to recognize
Lithuania. On March 8, 1990, three days prior to the official announcement, Jerzy
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Giedroyc wrote to Zbigniew Brzezinski that Lithuania was about to declare
independence. He stated in his letter that he would write to deputies in the Sejm that they
should recognize Lithuania’s independence quickly.
Poland’s policy towards the Ukrainian SSR shows how Poland deliberately
helped foster Ukrainian independence. On the twenty-fourth of August of 1990 the
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared itself to be sovereign but within the framework of the
Soviet Union. That day the Ukrainian SSR began signing agreements with Poland. A
month later, “in October 1990, Poland became the first country in the world to back the
idea of Ukrainian sovereignty.” 58 That same month the Polish foreign minister travelled
to Kyiv and signed an agreement on Polish-Ukrainian relations. This means that Poland
treated Ukraine as an independent country almost a full year before the actual declaration
of independence. On September 8th, 1991, the two countries signed:
a consular convention, a protocol on consultation between Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, and a communique on establishing diplomatic relations in the near future.
As a result of these agreements, and the fact that there were diplomatic
representatives in Warsaw and Kyiv… the leaders of Poland and Ukraine could
expand their mutual relations very quickly after Ukraine’s proclamation of
independence on August 24, 1991, and its subsequent confirmation by referendum
on December 1, 1991. Poland was the first country to announce recognition of
this act, a few hours after the Ukrainian proclamation. 59
By being supportive of Ukrainian leaders as they moved towards greater
autonomy and then outright independence, Poland helped reassure them that other
countries would back them if they left the Soviet Union. At the time this support was not
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only crucial but also not universal. Poland’s “early recognition [of Ukraine’s
independence] exceed the expectations of Ukrainian patriots, earned the Polish
ambassador in Moscow summons from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze,
and garnered disapproval from the United States.” 60 In contrast, the American President
Bush came to Kyiv prior to the independence vote and urged Ukrainians to support
Moscow. 61 Poland’s rapid support for Ukrainian independence also shows that Poland
was clearing following the Kultura program.
Poland’s well thought out policy reaped dividends for both countries. After 1991
Poland was “the leading supporter of including Ukraine in European and Western
institutions. Whether Ukraine will do so is a question appears still open. But that Poland
is trying so hard shows that Prometheanism remains very much alive and too important to
ignore.” 62 Kultura’s program was instrumental in helping both countries transition to
independence and peaceful cooperation:
Had Polish policy been hostile to Ukraine, some West Ukrainian activists would
have been distracted from the civic project of nation-building, and they would
have advanced a nationalism less appealing to Kyiv elites and the Russophone
Ukrainian majority. Had Poland advocated peaceful changes in frontiers, as for
example Hungary and Romania did at this time, much of the energy of West
Ukrainian activists would have been diverted. 63
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Poland’s support for Ukraine’s western orientation and independence in 1990—
1991 “produced in both capitals the sense that the support by one country for the
independence of the other was vital to itself.” 64 The first few years of the third Polish
Republic are full of examples that show that Poland still pursued an updated foreign
policy that drew on the core principles of Prometheanism.
Poland’s foreign policy after 1991 also shows the continuing influence of
Prometheanism. However, the struggle now became how to preserve the independence of
its eastern neighbors and ensure their westward orientation. The “neo-Promethean
movement, revived by the alliance of like-minded leaders of Eastern European states in
the mid-2000s and led primarily by Lech Kaczyński and Mikheil Saakashvili, both the
admirers of Piłsudski’s Promethean vision,” seeks to assist countries like the Baltics,
Ukraine and Georgia “in their endeavour to integrate with the Western institutions and to
get the West more involved in protecting these countries vis-à-vis Russia.” 65 According
to Paul A. Goble:
There are three other areas where Prometheanism remains on display. First,
Warsaw continues to promote democratic change and a Western rather than
Moscow orientation in the other countries around the periphery of Russia...
Second, it has become the leader of what might for want of a better term be called
‘the Baltic-Nordic caucus’ within the West, a grouping of countries led by Poland
and Estonia who want to ensure that the northeastern portion of Europe is more
closely tied to the West… And third, Poland has become even more important as
a center for the study of the peoples and politics of Eurasia, not only by attracting
scholars and journalists from east and west as the pre-war Promethean League did
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but also, again recapitulating the earlier experience, conducting research and
issuing publications that are helping to define how each side views the other. 66
Poland’s foreign policy, although constrained by limited means, consistently
seeks to help Russia’s neighbors integrate into western institutions and thereby prevent
them from falling under Russia’s control. For example, in 2014 Ukraine’s President
Poroshenko came to Warsaw and addressed Poland’s parliament. In addition to thanking
Poland for supporting Ukraine during the difficult year he also paraphrased Piłsudski
when he said that, “Existence of independent Ukraine has a strategic dimension for
Poland and is a very important factor that encourages Poland’s independence too.
Similarly, Poland has a strategic dimension for Ukraine as well.” 67 Therefore, there were
still elements of Prometheanism in Polish foreign policy after 1991.
Poland’s commitment to Georgia’s independence is one of the best examples of
the continuing influence of Prometheanism today. The importance of Prometheanism to
Georgia and Poland is shown by a statue of the Greek mythological figure Prometheus in
Tbilisi. 68 The presidents of Poland, Lithuania and Georgia attended the November 22th
2007, unveiling of the statue. “The statue symbolised the international anti-communist
movement of Prometheism of the 1920s and 1930s.” 69 If the meaning of the statue of the
titan for whom Prometheanism was named was not clear enough, President Kaczynski’s
comments that day should have left no doubt as to what message the leaders tried to send
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to Russia and the world. In his speech Kaczynski clearly stated that Georgian freedom is
vital to Poland’s freedom:
I am overcome with deep emotion as I receive this decoration from the hands of
the President of the nation which has for centuries been resisting the Russian
imperialism, the nation which for almost 18 centuries has been a Christian nation,
a nation which after 1989 stood as a model of attachment of freedom, which
fought to regain it after the Bolshevik revolution and has actually regained it for a
few years… You referred, Mr President, to Georgian officers in the Polish army.
This gesture was not a coincidental one on the part of Marshal Piłsudski. After
1920, in Poland we had many officers from various armies but it was only
Georgian officers and a few Azeri ones who could serve in our army on a par.
This was an expression of our sense of affinity with you. This feeling of affinity is
still alive and translates into excellent relations between us and into very good
relations with Mr Micheil [sic] Saakashvili. 70
Later that day President Kaczynski spoke with the Polish press and again stated
that Poland’s policy remained to ensure the continued independence of the nations in the
Caucasus:
Poland is profoundly interested in the development of democracy in Georgia, in
stabilization of the situation in that country and in forging possibly closest
relations between our two countries. These relations are underpinned not only
with the sense of affinity between our two nations… but they are also connected
with intentional and consistent policy pursued by Poland especially in the last two
years. That policy consists in developing possibly closest relations with the
countries south east of Poland. This refers to Ukraine but also to Georgia,
Azerbaijan and perhaps also other states in the long-term perspective. This is a
policy which we would never want to change and its central part consists in
providing support to European aspirations of these countries, i.e. aspirations to
join NATO in the first place, and in a certain time perspective also to secure
membership of the European Union. 71
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The symbolism of the Promethean statue is backed up by a commitment to bring
Georgia and other neighboring countries into western institution in order to prevent the
Russians from being able to recreate a sphere of influence in the region. This is the
President of Poland openly repeating Giedroyc’s ideas that built off the logic of
Prometheanism.
Kaczynski’s support of Georgia did not just consist of empty platitudes; he risked
his own personal safety during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 by flying to
Tbilisi.72 There he toured the battlefield with Saakashvili and was reportedly fired upon
by Russian soldiers. 73 In a show of solidarity during that trip he stood alongside President
Saakashvili, President Yushchenko, and the Presidents of the three Baltic countries. 74
Saakashvili repaid his debt “by being one of the few leaders to brave the ash clouds and
fly to Poland for Kaczynski’s funeral.” 75 Upon Kaczynski death in 2010, Saakashvili
declared him to be a hero of Georgia and awarded him with the Order of the National
Hero of Georgia, that country’s highest award. 76
After 1989 Poland joined Western Europe and integrated into its supranational
institutions. While this may seem like it is a counterargument to the idea that Piłsudski
and Kultura are still influential, in reality it is not. Piłsudski hoped to free the captive
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nations in the Soviet Union and then form a federation of eastern European countries, a
concept he called the Międzymorze, which means “Between-seas” and is referred to by
English language historians as the Intermarium. 77 Kultura took the idea of a Intermarium
federation and updated it to a world where NATO and the EC existed, just like it updated
Prometheanism. 78 In keeping Kultura’s program, independent Poland immediately tried
to integrate within multi-national bodies. As early as 1952 Juliusz Mieroszewski wrote
that independence for small countries is a fiction in modern world. He wrote that Poland
should not chase after utopian visions of unfettered sovereignty. 79 He further presaged
Poland’s eventual entry into the European Union by calling for Poland to see itself and its
history as part of Europe rather than as a unique country that functioned a Europe’s
bedrock and the last bastion of Christianity. 80 Even though in his 1952 article
Mieroszewski warned Poland against heroic last stands and the sort of violent fight for
independence that Piłsudski led, this was not a refutation of what Piłsudski did but rather
a call a new form of struggle for Polish freedom in the face of overwhelming Soviet
military power and the experiences of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. 81 The new form of
struggle he called for was for a federated Europe of which Poland would be apart. This
harkened back to Piłsudski’s idea for a Baltic to Black sea federation but with the
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acknowledgement that Poland was not a leading great power. 82 This federation of the
countries between the seas was for Mieroszewski the only way Poland could hope to keep
the territories seized from Germany in 1945. 83 An early example of this was Poland’s
negations with Czechoslovakia and Hungary that led to the formation of the Visegrád
Group in 1991.
Piłsudski did not foresee organizations like NATO and the EU but Poland’s
enthusiasm for joining them does have a precedent in his thinking as updated by his
followers in exile during the communist era. For Giedroyc and other Kultura
contributors, Poland’s promotion of a western oriented Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania
complemented rather than opposed Poland’s EU accession. 84 “In discussing the
unification of Europe, many members of Poland's political and intellectual elites cite
Kultura as their guide on how to achieve this goal. Fifty years after Kultura initiated its
idea of a unification of Europe, a free Poland, together with the other eastern European
nations, is on its way to fulfilling Kultura's vision.” 85 Poland’s participation in the EU
and NATO complements rather than replaces the Promethean aspects of Poland’s foreign
policy. Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister from 2007 to 2014, also noted this.
In describing Poland’s place in the world he said that, “Rather than a buffer, it is better to
be a promontory, projecting stability and Euro-Atlantic values to the East. Poland has two
foreign-policy traditions: the mediaeval Piast tradition, whose main gambit was to anchor
us in the West by adopting Latin Christianity; the later Jagiellon tradition was essentially
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about using that anchoring to spread Western influences to the East. Membership of the
EU allows us to pursue both.” 86 Therefore, Poland’s place in Europe today does not
change Poland’s need to border friendly countries to the east. To ensure this happens
Poland still needs to promote nationalism in non-Russian ethnicities, like Ukrainians.
Rather than alleviating these requirements the EU helps Poland do this more effectively.
Sikorski’s statements also lend credibility to the idea that Prometheanism still
influences Polish foreign policy. In his address on Polish foreign policy in 2014, he made
one of the finest statements clarifying the legacy of Prometheanism in modern Poland. He
described Poland’s foreign policy as a modernized version of Jerzy Giedroyc’s foreign
policy doctrines. Sikorski described Giedroyc as the “patron of foreign policy of a free
post-1989 Poland,” and then went on to describe point by point how Polish foreign policy
in 2014 still follows the precepts laid down by Giedroyc. 87 If Poland’s foreign policy is a
modernized version of Jerzy Giedroyc’s ideas, then it is also an updated version of
Piłsudski’s strategic vision, of which Prometheanism was a relevant part. While working
in the United States in 2004, Sikorski wrote about his experiences as a journalist in
Afghanistan. He said that, “The victory in Afghanistan in the 1980s remains instructive
today, because it shows that the best way of affecting events in foreign lands is not
necessarily to send troops, but to empower your friends to do what they want to do
anyway. The trick is to use other people's patriotism to the desired ends. Proxy war is to
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preventive war what judo is to boxing: A black belt beats Mike Tyson every time.” 88 This
quote is important for a couple of reasons; it shows that he was using the same logic that
underlined Prometheanism. Additionally, he first saw how patriotism and ethno-religious
conflict can be used to weaken Russia and the Soviet Union where the United States first
began to actively support non-Russian nationalism in the USSR.
In conclusion, Prometheanism survived the fall of the Second Republic in 1939 in
Polish thinking about strategy and Poland’s relations with its neighbors. After the war
Jerzy Giedroyc, who worked in Piłsudski’s project in the 1920s—1930s, founded the
journal Kultura. Gathering together veterans of Prometheanism and other writers in that
journal Giedroyc managed to adapt the principles of Prometheanism to Poland’s strategic
reality in the Cold War. This formed the basis of the thinking of non-communist Poland’s
foreign policy after 1989. Due to Kultura’s influence the newly freed Polish state made
no territorial demands on its neighbors and encouraged them to break away from the
Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union Poland has continued to help former
Soviet Republics join NATO and the EU. This part of Poland’s strategy can be traced
back to Kultura and from there to Piłsudski’s efforts to break up the USSR along ethnic
lines.
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CHAPTER 3: ACROSS THE POND

Prometheanism influenced the foreign policy of the United States as well as
Poland’s. To be precise, several notable Polish Americans called for the United States to
adopt policies that closely resemble Prometheanism. The idea that Prometheanism
influences US policy has been mentioned by historians, scholars, and activists. Timothy
Snyder wrote that after the Cold War and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 “A
shadow of Prometheanism stirred… This general project now enjoyed some support from
a democratic European Union, as well as from the United States.” 89 The direct
connection with Prometheanism is not as strong in the United States as it is in Poland but
there are strands of continuity between the policies of Piłsudski and the modern foreign
policy of the United States. However, while Polish Americans did not exclusively call for
the United States to support the breakup of the Soviet Union a group of Polish Americans
did significantly influence the faction or lobby that called for the United States to
promote nationalism in the USSR and this lobby did at least partially succeed in
accomplishing their goals.
To see that Prometheanism has influenced the foreign policy of the United States
it is important to prove several points. First, the United States or at least parts of the
foreign policy establishment seek or sought to break up either the Soviet Union or the
Russian Federation along ethnic lines. Second, this was not always the foreign policy of
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the United States towards Russia or the Soviet Union. Third, the Polish Americans,
especially first generation Polish Americans, helped to shape United States policy. An
overview of the US-Russian relations shows that, while never official United States
policy, factions in the United States did try to break up the Soviet Union along ethnic
lines. This policy did not predate the Cold War and therefore was not a long standing
policy of the United States. Finally, Polish Americans, some with familial ties to
Piłsudski’s government or ties to Kultura, did influence United States policy along these
lines in conjunction with other ethnic lobbies and American anti-communist cold
warriors.
The United States has used nationalism to take countries out of Russia’s control
or sphere of influence and integrate them into a western oriented supranational
federation, just like Piłsudski tried to do. Since the Cold War ended, the West, led by the
United States, has sought to reduce or eliminate Russia’s sphere of influence by bringing
more and more states into NATO and the European Union, not only former Warsaw Pact
member states but former republics of the Soviet Union. 90 The West also supported color
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, 91 and Kyrgyzstan 92 that replaced pro-Russian leaders
with pro-Western leaders who have attempted to bring their countries into NATO and
wanted to distance them from Russia. 93 In 2013 and 2014 the West and the United States
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in particular helped to overthrow the pro-Russian government of Ukraine and replace it
with a pro-NATO one. 94 There are even assertions by the Russians that the United States
is providing help to further break up the Russian Federation along ethnic lines. 95 Also,
there are statements by politicians that show that the breakup of the Soviet Union and
Russia is something that they hoped for. Robert Gates wrote that Dick Cheney wanted to
break up the Russian Federation, “When the Soviet Union was collapsing in late 1991,
Dick wanted to see the dismantlement not only of the Soviet Union and the Russian
empire but of Russia itself, so it could never again be a threat to the rest of the world.” 96
Although United States support for ethnic fragmentation is rarely discussed in those
terms openly in western media, the idea that the United States does so is widespread.
When discussing why the United States should support the Orange Revolution, which
switched Ukraine to a pro-western orientation, Charles Krauthammer wrote that, “This is
about Russia first, democracy second.” 97 While never official policy, the US has sought
to weaken Moscow by supporting nationalism in the former Soviet Republics and to
consolidate those gains by then bringing those countries into NATO.
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Promtheanism under Piłsudski was never an official policy of the Polish state. It
has never been an official policy of the government of the United States either. Like in
Poland, an informal group of supporters promotes Prometheanism in the United States. In
Poland, Piłsudski supported the movement and appointed his friends who also did to
important positions that allowed them to work on the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the
United States, Prometheans never had such a powerful patron but there were members of
the foreign policy establishment who called for similar measures. For example, Freedom
House is a non-governmental organization that sponsored the American Committee for
Peace in the Caucasus. This group “supported the Chechen rebel movement, apparently
as a strategy to weaken Russia and establish better U.S. ties in a region of increasing
geopolitical value, which has vast, unexploited natural resource reserves including rich
oil, gas, and hard mineral deposits.” 98 Just like Piłsudski invited exiled nationalists, US
based Prometheans have invited exiled Chechnyan leaders. Mathew Brzezinski, nephew
of Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote an article describing how Ilyas Akhmadov, a man wanted
in Russia on terrorism charges, came to reside in the United States, “How is this
possible? Well, it doesn't hurt that Akhmadov enjoys the patronage of a group of very
senior Washington luminaries. His backers include two former secretaries of state,
Madeleine Albright and Alexander Haig; a former defense secretary, Frank Carlucci; a
former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.” 99

98

“American Committee for Peace in Chechnya,” Right Web - Institute for Policy Studies, April 26, 2013,
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/American_Committee_for_Peace_in_Chechnya.
99

It should also be noted that Madeleine Albright was a former student of Brzezinski who also mentored
her. The two shared a bond because Brzezinski’s wife is Czech, like Albright whose family went into exile
for being aligned with former President Edvard Benes. Brzezinski’s wife is Benes’s grand-niece; Matthew
Brzezinski, “Surrealpolitik: How a Chechen Terror Suspect Wound up Living on Taxpayers’ Dollars near
the National Zoo,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2005.

37
Russian politicians frequently state that the United States supported breaking up
the Soviet Union and even the Russian Federation. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign
minister, stated that “the West unequivocally demonstrates that it does not merely seek to
change Russian policy (which in itself is illusory), but it seeks to change the regime —
and practically nobody denies this.” 100 In his comments it is clear that he believes that the
US seeks to do this by breaking the Ukraine away from Russia. “Ukraine’s Association
Agreement with the EU had nothing to do with inviting Ukraine to join the EU and was
aimed in the short term at preventing it from joining the Customs Union.” 101 The
separation of Ukraine from Russia in order to weaken Russia was a primary aim of
Prometheanism, and according to Russian officials this is exactly what the United States
is trying to accomplish as of 2014.
President Vladimir Putin’s summary of the history of United States policy in an
October 2014 speech shows that he believes that the United States has a neo-Promethean
agenda. Putin summarized a long list of United States actions towards Russia including a
section where he described support to groups that sought to destabilize and dismember
Russia. He said that the United States, “once sponsored Islamic extremist movements to
fight the Soviet Union… The West if not supported, at least closed its eyes, and, I would
say, gave information, political and financial support to international terrorists’ invasion
of Russia (we have not forgotten this) and the Central Asian region’s countries.” 102 In his
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2014 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Putin clearly states that the United States
seeks to break Russia apart by supporting separatist movements:
We remember well how and who, almost openly, supported separatism back then
and even outright terrorism in Russia… the support for separatism in Russia from
across the pond, including information, political and financial support and support
provided by the special services – was absolutely obvious and left no doubt that
they would gladly let Russia follow the Yugoslav scenario of disintegration and
dismemberment. With all the tragic fallout for the people of Russia. 103
The United States actions described by Putin are similar in means and scope to
Piłsudski’s program. They both sought to create ethnic strife in Russia. They both
extended into Central Asia. And finally, like Prometheanism under Piłsudski, United
States policies were covert and only partially supported and implemented. All these
examples show that the United States has to some degree supported policies meant to
fragment the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation along ethnic lines.
However, this has not always been true. Prior to the start of the Cold War, the
United States and Russia had a fruitful partnership and at times even an alliance. It began
in the earliest days of the United States. During the Revolutionary War Great Britain
hired mercenaries from across Europe, the most famous being the Hessians. Catherine the
Great forbid the recruitment of mercenaries by the British in her territories. Her favorable
diplomatic stance towards the fledgling United States and her “Declaration of Armed
Neutrality” indirectly helped the American colonies establish independence from the
British Empire. 104 Alexander I’s diplomacy helped end the War of 1812. 105 Alexander II
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sent the Russian fleet to the United States during the Civil War and was the largest show
of support the Union received from any foreign nation. The move was much appreciated
at the time. Lincoln in his declaration issued on Thanksgiving thanked the Almighty that
no European nations used the Civil War as an opportunity to intervene into American
affairs. 106 After the Civil War Congress authorized the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to
go to Russia to offer the Czar the US’s official congratulations on behalf of surviving an
assassination attempt, but the trip also served as an unofficial “thank you” tour. 107 The
idea of a Russian-American alliance even penetrated popular culture. In his 1878 novel
Anna Karenina Leo Tolstoy references this alliance. 108
This pattern of friendly relations cools a bit in the early twentieth century but
there is still no evidence of a Promethean movement in the United States. After the
Russian Revolution, US forces intervened in Russia in order to strengthen the White
faction and keep Russia in the war against Germany, not to weaken Russia. In the
interwar years, the United States military prepared a series of war plans. The military
made plans for a war against Britain, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Germany and others but did
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not have a plan for war against the Soviet Union. 109 One the first major foreign policy
decisions made by President Franklin Roosevelt was the formal recognition of the
USSR. 110 Of course the two countries fought against Germany together in World War II.
Roosevelt’s negotiations at Tehran and Yalta in effect recognized Stalin’s seizure of the
Baltic republics and Moldova. It also allowed for Stalin to create a series of satellite
states in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt’s diplomatic record shows that he did not concern
himself about the independence of nations such as Ukraine and Georgia. 111 Once again
this shows that Piłsudski’s Prometheanism predates any efforts to do likewise by the
United States on any appreciable scale. 112
After World War II and the onset of the Cold War the United States needed a
policy to deal with the Soviet threat. At first the United States sought to prevent further
Soviet advances through a policy of “containment.” Gradually the US began to consider
the idea of ending the Soviet Union and the danger it posed by breaking it apart along
ethnic lines. One of the significant milestones in this process happened towards the end
of the Eisenhower administration:
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As a result, in 1959, at the end of his second term, President Dwight Eisenhower
added the Captive Nations resolution to his policy of ‘rollback.’ … It stated that
the independence of submerged nations was in the vital interest of the United
States… However… it is widely acknowledged that the main purpose of the
Captive Nations resolution was rhetorical. In a talk with Soviet Ambassador to the
United States Anatoliy Dobrynin on June 12, 1969, Henry Kissinger, President
Nixon's adviser on national security, asked him not to pay attention “to separate
public critical statements by the president on one East European country or
another, since this is only a tribute to some layers of the U. S. population which
play a role in American elections.” 113
A couple of points standout from this summary; the first is that ethnic lobbies in
the United States were responsible for the passage of the Captive Nations resolutions. 114
Second, the resolution was rhetorical and did not result in much aid to nationalists in the
non-Russian Soviet republics. It was not until members of those ethnic lobbies entered
powerful positions in the United States establishment that the United States began to
support national movements in the USSR. Several notable Polish Americans advised the
United States to triumph in the Cold War by breaking up the Soviet Union along ethnic
lines. In other words the response to the Soviet threat should be a neo-Promethean
strategy.
The United States only gradually, fitfully, and partially adopted a strategy of
dealing with the Soviet Union and Russia that incorporated principles of Prometheanism.
When the Cold War began in the late 1940s the United States adopted the containment
strategy advocated by George F. Keenan. Under the Nixon and Ford administrations the
United States tried a balance of power strategy with the Soviet Union, known as Détente.
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It was finally under Carter that a Polish-American with an understanding of non-Russian
nationalities came to occupy a position of influence that Promethean ideas started gaining
traction.
From the time he advised the 1960 Kennedy campaign through his time as
National Security Advisor and an advisor to the 2007 Obama campaign and beyond,
Brzezinski has been the principle advocate for US policies that incorporate elements of
Prometheanism. When discussing why the United States needs to develop a close
relationship with Poland while giving the keynote address at the launch of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies launch of the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy, he
cited Prometheanism as a key contribution Polish strategy can give to the United States:
It was in Poland, for example, that the so-called ‘Promethean League’ was
sponsored. The Promethean League was a league dedicated to the idea that some
day the non-Russian people of the old Tsarist empire, and then of the Soviet
Union, will have their own independence. That was the political concept which
was actively propagated and which had, incidentally, a very specific military
dimension. The pre-World War II Polish army had a number of senior officers
who were Ukrainians, who were Georgians, who were Armenians, and so forth. In
fact, that now has an American connection because one of our very recent
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, a Georgian native, was born
in Poland, where his father was a colonel in the Polish army and a deputy
commander of the most elite cavalry regiment in the Polish army. And this
wasn’t—I hastily add—philanthropy. This was deliberate political action based on
a certain political interest. So there is this connection, and it continued through
World War II. 115
He argued that Promethean ideas strengthen the security of the United States
security and specifically used Piłsudski’s idea as a conceptual basis for United States
policy.
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In the 1970s as Brzezinski tried to convince the Carter administration of the
importance of covert action to help promote nationalist independence movements, he met
with stiff resistance. Robert Gates, an assistant to Brzezinski in the Carter years, wrote
that Brzezinski’s proposals were initially rejected because the State Department “claimed
that the United States didn’t know enough about Soviet nationalities and asserted that a
tighter, more focused effort was clearly needed to increase our knowledge.” 116
Throughout the Cold War officials in the State department did not think that the
independence of the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Georgia and the Central Asians states was
worth the risking peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.
Brzezinski was thus the primary conduit of Piłsudski’s program into United States
foreign policy. Brzezinski’s upbringing played an important role in shaping his ideas and
helping him grasp the utility of Prometheanism. His father, Tadeusz Brzeziński, was born
in modern day Zolochiv, Ukraine which was then located within the Austrian partition of
Poland. 117 The region in which Zolochiv is located, Galicia, was ethnically quite diverse
at the time. The population there consisted of Poles, Ukrainians and Jews. The elder
Brzeziński went to university in Lviv, which is the center of Ukrainian nationalism.
Tadeusz fought in the Polish-Soviet War and took part in the battles of Lvov and Warsaw.
Young Zbigniew Brzezinski was born in Warsaw in 1928. In 1939 he travelled to Canada
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when his father was appointed as the consul general in Montreal. 118 This upbringing
allowed him to intuitively understand the principles of Polish diplomacy, Prometheanism,
and the ethnic diversity of the Soviet Union.
Brzezinski corresponded with Giedroyc, the editor of Kultura, up to the late
nineteen-nineties. They began working together in the 1950s and Brzezinski even
financially supported Kultura. In a letter in 1999, Giedroyc gave Brzezinski an update on
the situation on the ground in Belarus and noted that the Polish Institute in Minsk had
published parts of The Grand Chessboard. Giedroyc noted that Brzezinski had penetrated
even the “black hole” of Belarus and this would likely lead to a lengthy discussion. 119
This contact with Giedroyc was another way for Brzezinski to come into contact with the
ideas of Prometheanism.
Brzezinski has a long history of calling for a foreign policy based upon principles
and aims of Prometheanism. This began in the 1940s while he worked on his Master’s
degree. His thesis was entitled Russo-Soviet Nationalism. In it he wrote that, “nationalism
is becoming a constantly greater force in even the most hitherto backward Union
Republics, and is developing decentralizing tendencies and challenging the Russian
supremacy. This constitutes a direct danger to the USSR.” 120 Furthermore his
recommendation at the conclusion of his thesis called for a western based Prometheanlike organization. He wrote that, “The Western world has at its disposal all the means to
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create a multi-national anti-Soviet version of the Comintern - and its appeal would be
exceedingly powerful… Russo-Soviet Nationalism and what we believe to be true
Freedom will clash someday - and understanding the component elements of RussoSoviet Nationalism may help a great deal the cause of Freedom.” 121 Brzezinski wrote in
1969 that, “We still live in the age of nationalism, and… it is going to be exceedingly
difficult for the Soviet Union to avoid having some of its many nationalities go through a
phase of assertive nationalism… I frankly do not see how the central authorities in the
Soviet Union will be able to avoid having a prolonged period of fairly difficult relations
with the non-Russian nationalities.” 122 This is exceedingly similar to Piłsudski’s
Promethean plan, a non-Russian ethnic organization designed to promote independence
movements in the Soviet Union.
Under Carter, with Brzezinski as his principle adviser on foreign affairs issues, the
United States began to change course and began taking steps towards breaking up the
Soviet Union along ethnic lines. Biographies of Brzezinski as well as summaries of his
foreign policy repeatedly stress that he advocated the liberation of ethnic groups within
the Soviet Union as a way of relieving if not ending the communist threat to the United
States. Repeatedly historians stress his contribution to getting policies that help foster
non-Russian nationalism in the USSR implemented. For example, his biographer Andrzej
Lubowski wrote that, “As opposed to other noted Kremlinologists, Brzezinski always
knew that the Soviet Union was no monolith, and that ethnic problems were one of the
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main weakness of the Soviet super-power.” 123 Justin Vaisse wrote that “above all he
stressed the multiethnic configuration of the Soviet Union, an issue he had been
highlighting since the 1960s. Describing the ‘national problem’ as the ‘Achilles’ heel of
[Gorbachev’s] perestroika.” 124 He further added that “Few Western analysts at the time
ascribed much political importance to Soviet nationalities and ethnic groups, but
Brzezinski raised the issue” 125 His biographers agree that he consistently argued from
1949 till the end of the Cold War that the Soviet Union could be torn apart by the forces
of nationalism. Another important point to make is that if this was obvious or common
knowledge to the United States foreign policy establishment then it would not be an
important or notable item for historians and biographers to notice, let alone be one of the
highlights of his career.
Brzezinski’s proposals met with resistance. While in hindsight the importance of
liberating the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union clearly seems like a good endgoal for the Cold War, the State Department and the CIA opposed the breakup of the
Soviet Union. Brzezinski described working with Carter to implement Peaceful
Engagement like this:
He bought my commitment to human rights and I shared his, except that mine had
a special twist when it came to the Soviet Union. Carter was initially hesitant but
eventually approved my recommendation that we undermine Soviet cohesion by
supporting the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet
Union—even though the State Department came in with a counterrecommendation not to do it, which they justified on grounds that were
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unbelievable. State maintained that just as there is an American nation made up of
people of different ethnic origins, there is a Soviet nation made up of people of
different ethnic origins. I remember asking someone at State, “Do you happen to
know what language the ‘Soviet nation’ speaks? Is it the Soviet language?” There
is no common language. The Ukrainians speak Ukrainian. The Turkmanis speak
Turkman. The Kazakh speak Kazakh, and the Balts didn’t consider themselves to
be part of the Soviet Union. This is not America where we individually adopt the
American version of English as a common language. 126
Several points stand out here. Even as late as the 1970s the United States State
department did not understand that the Soviet Union was comprised of many different
nations and was vulnerable to breakup along ethnic lines. It took a Polish American to
finally convince the United States establishment that the Soviet Union was not Russia
and that it was not an ethnic monolith. Despite bureaucratic resistance the United States
did eventually take steps to foster the national aspirations of the non-Russian groups in
the USSR, just like Piłsudski tried to do.
Robert Gates’ account of these efforts in his memoirs corroborate Brzezinski’s
description of events. Gates described how Brzezinski “was deeply interested in
exploiting the Soviet’s nationalities problem. He wanted to pursue covert action in that
arena.” 127 His efforts were foiled by the resistance of the CIA and the State department.
While the full scope of the measures he called for were never fully implemented,
“Brzezinski, with Carter’s support, had set forth an ambitious agenda of covert action to
stir up trouble inside the USSR… there was a significant increase in the quantity of
dissident and Western information and literature smuggled into Eastern Europe and the
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USSR.” 128 From Gate’s recollection of events it is clear that Brzezinski advocated for a
policy influenced by Piłsudski’s program and that he met with resistance but ultimately
got part of his program across.
Brzezinski did not convince Carter to give his full support to ethnic independence
movements in the Soviet Union but he did successfully implement other covert actions
that undermined the Soviet Union. He was particularly successful in his covert religious
policies. The rise of Islamic opposition to the Soviet Union that Brzezinski hoped would
eventually spread north from Afghanistan in to the central Asian Soviet Republics is a
notable example. Brzezinski stated in an interview that:
According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began
during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec
1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed,
it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to
the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a
note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was
going to induce a Soviet military intervention… The day that the Soviets
officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the
opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years,
Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that
brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire. 129
This does not mean that Brzezinski created the Taliban to destroy the Soviet
Union or that he lured the Soviets into Afghanistan but it does show that he understood
that religion as well as nationalism could destabilize the Soviet Union. 130 This was
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another aspect of how United States policy bears resemblance to Prometheanism, as well
as an older Polish strategy, that Brzezinski utilized. 131
The fall of the Soviet Union did not end Brzezinski’s calls for action by the
United States that paralleled important elements of Prometheanism. His magnum opus,
The Grand Chessboard, is full of advice that Piłsudski would have approved of. The
book’s thesis is that United States security requires the country to maintain its primacy in
Eurasia. In the section dedicated towards how to handle the ex-USSR, Brzezinski
repeatedly states that United States security would be greatly aided by an independent
Ukraine, the most important plank of Prometheanism. For example, “Ukraine, a new and
important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very
existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia
ceases to be a Eurasian empire.” 132 He further added that, “if Moscow regains control
over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the
Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful
imperial state… Ukraine’s loss of independence would have immediate
consequences.” 133 The using the same logic that underlined Piłsudski’s Kiev campaign
Brzezinski stated that the independence of Ukraine represented a “vital geopolitical
setback for the Russian state… The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it
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drastically limited Russia’s geostrategic options. Even without the Baltic states and
Poland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek to be the leader of an
assertive Eurasian empire.” 134 Prometheanism for Brzezinski was not just about ending
the Cold War, it meant maintaining the gains after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
preventing a resurgence of Russian power.
Carter’s failed reelection bid did not end the Promethean presence on the National
Security Council. After Ronald Reagan’s election Richard Pipes continued Brzezinski’s
program of breaking apart the USSR. Richard Pipes is a scholar of Russia born in Poland
to an assimilated Jewish family. He is the son of Marek Pipes who served in Pilsudski’s
Polish Legions. 135 The Pipes family fled Poland in the early months of World War II.
Richard Pipes helped to mobilize the resources of the United States against the Soviet
Union as one of leading figures of Team-B project in the 1970s. He served under
President Reagan as a member of the National Security Council, holding the post of
Director of East European and Soviet Affairs. Brzezinski, as President Carter’s National
Security Adviser, formed the Nationalities Working Group (NWG) which he dedicated to
the idea of weakening the Soviet Union by inflaming its ethnic tensions. Richard Pipes
took over the leadership of the NWG in 1981. Due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
the focus of United States Prometheanism transitioned to Central Asia rather than
Ukraine. In 1984, Pipes predicted Muslims in the Soviet Union would “explode into
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genocidal fury” against Moscow if properly encouraged. 136 The focus on Central Asia, is
in keeping with the historic scope of Prometheanism under Pilsudksi which also featured
a Central Asian division.
While not as prolifically Promethean as Brzezinski, throughout his career Pipes
also called for the independence of non-Russian ethnicities in the Soviet Union. For
example in 1984 he wrote that “The key to peace, therefore, lies in an internal
transformation of the Soviet system in the direction of legality, economic
decentralization, greater scope for contractual work and free enterprise, and national selfdetermination.” 137 Pipes then went on to call for a Promethean-like movement that would
help break up the Soviet Union along ethnic lines, “The West would be well advised to do
all in its power to assist the indigenous forces making for change in the U.S.S.R. and its
client states, forces that are eating away at the Stalinist foundations of communist
regimes.” 138
Policies similar to Prometheanism did not end with the collapse of the USSR.
Brzezinski’s ideas, allies, and disciples were influential in shaping United States foreign
policy after the end of the Cold War. For example, in 1991 George Bush declared in Kiev
that the United States did not support the idea of an independent Ukraine a few weeks
before the vote on independence. After the Cold War ended and the risk of a direct
confrontation with the nuclear armed USSR receded, the United States could be bolder in
supporting nationalists in the former Soviet Union. For example in 1996, the Secretary of
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Defense William Perry stated that, “I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as
an independent nation to the security and stability of all Europe.” 139 Compare this to the
“Chicken Kiev” speech by President George Bush in 1991 when he stated that the United
States did not support the breakup of the Soviet Union. 140 The breakup of the Soviet
Union did not mean the end of Promethean ideas in the United States in fact it made it
clear that the United States was in a stronger position in Eurasia than before.
Polish Americans in influential positions continued to call for the United States to
capitalize on the fall of the USSR by integrating its former republics into western security
structures like NATO. This is similar to what Piłsudski hoped to do with the nations that
he hoped to break free from Moscow’s control in the 1920s. For example, Ian
Brzezinski, son of Zbigniew Brzezinski, served as an advisor to the Ukrainian National
Security Council and also as a foreign policy advisor to Senator William Roth, who in
1996 became the President of NATO’s parliament. 141 In 1996 the United States’ highest
ranked military official the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General John
Shalikashvili who was born in Warsaw and was the son of a prominent Promethean
recruit in the Polish military. These are all posts that influence United States policy
towards Ukraine. Both Ian Brzezniski and John Shalikashvili called for NATO
enlargement and the incorporation of former Soviet Republics in NATO. As this would
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reduce the Russian sphere of influence, it is how the United States carries out its
Promethean agenda. 142
Jan Nowak is another example of a Polish refugee who used Promethean
reasoning in the post-Cold War United States. Nowak was a Polish Home Army veteran,
the head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe, an advisor to the National Security
Agency, President Reagan and President Carter. He worked with Zbigniew Brzezinski
since the 1950s. After the end of the Cold War he called for the inclusion of Poland and
Ukraine into NATO. “The enlargement of NATO is a key to the future cooperation
between NATO and Russia. Any attempt to accommodate Russian nationalism would
produce the opposite effect. Only the admission into NATO of all aspirants in the area
between the present border of NATO and Russia may direct Russian resources and energy
into the solution of its internal, highly critical problems.” 143 Once again, the
independence of Ukraine ensured by its inclusion into NATO is portrayed as vital to
United States security.
In addition to these high profile examples there were other lower level contacts
between the United States and Prometheanism. The intelligence agencies of the United
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States kept records about Prometheanism. Johnathan Levy for this thesis, The
Intermarium, Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism, examined over one
hundred declassified documents from the CIA, US Army Counter-intelligence, and the
FBI as well as conducting interviews with former intelligence officials. He concluded that
after World War II the CIA and other organizations recruited former Prometheans to act
as anti-Soviet agents. American intelligence agencies have been in contact with
individuals involved with Prometheanism since at least 1947. 144
One of the main reasons why the United States incorporated parts of the
Promethean agenda is because it is strategically beneficial to do so. Therefore Polish
Americans who called for the liberation of non-Russian nations and their orientation to
the West were not going against the best interests of the United States. The logic behind
weakening Russia for the United States also shows that these ideas rose to prominence
due to their merit and not because of an effective ethnic lobby.
To understand Prometheanism’s relevance to the United States it is important to
be grounded in geopolitical theory and strategic thinking. In 1919, the British strategist
Sir Halford Mackinder dubbed Eurasia the “World Island” due to its central strategic
importance in the world and geopolitical thinkers have been using his phrase ever since.
This idea has since helped to shape United States foreign policy. For example Zbigniew
Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard argues that the United States’ security and status in
the world require that no other power be able to dominate the Eurasian landmass. Eurasia
is largest, most populous, richest, and in aggregate most powerful continent on Earth. If
any single power were able to dominate Eurasia then the United States would be unable
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to maintain its position in the world. 145 If either Germany had triumphed in World War
II, or the Soviet Union prevailed in the Cold War and spread their influence over Eurasia,
then the United States would have been faced with a rival capable of harnessing resources
that would far exceed the capacity of the United States and the entirety of the Americas to
match. The idea that the United States cannot exist as an island removed from the world
and hope to survive by hiding behind the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans has been widely
held by Washington since the 1940s. 146
The need to prevent a single power from controlling Eurasia is not a new nor a
transient idea. It actually predates the rise of the United States to global preeminence,
having first been articulated during the height of the British Empire by Mackinder. He
wrote that, “If the whole World Island, or the larger part of it, were to become a single
united base of seapower, then would not the insular nations be out-built as regards ships
and out-manned as regards seaman?” 147 American leaders understood this in the lead up
to the United States’ entry into World War II. Admiral Stark wrote President Roosevelt
that if Nazi Germany successfully managed to consolidate its grip on Eurasia then, “the
problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere,
we might, possibly, not win anywhere… in these circumstances we would be set back
upon our haunches. Our war effort, instead of being widespread, would then have to be
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confined to the Western Hemisphere.” 148 Obviously this dealt with Nazi Germany and
not the Soviet Union, but the reasoning is the same. If either of those powers controlled
Eurasia the resources of the United States might not be sufficient to fend them off. When
the USSR replaced Germany as the main threat to security of the United States in the
eastern hemisphere, it would only be logical to find a policy to weaken that competitor
from the inside out.
In the post-Cold War world this analysis is still valid. Alexandros Petersen argues
precisely this in his book, The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the
West. After writing why United States influence in Eurasia is important for its national
security he goes on to propose two main models of how the United States can limit the
power of Russia and China. Petersen uses two main models for the United States moving
forward, George Kennan’s Containment and Josef Piłsudski’s Prometheanism. In The
World Island he argues that Piłsudski’s ideas should be a part of the “basis for informing
today’s Western strategy in Eurasia.” 149 The first sentence of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The
Grand Chessboard reads, “Ever since the continents started interacting politically, some
five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power.” 150 He goes on to
warn that even after the end of the Cold War “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger
emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America.” 151
Therefore, even though the Russian Federation and China do not pose the same level of
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imminent danger to the United States as did Nazi Germany with its Japanese allies or the
Soviet Union did, United States security still demands involvement on the Eurasian
landmass.
The idea that Piłsudski or the Second Polish Republic have been influential in
helping shape United States foreign policy is not as farfetched as it sounds at first
considering the impact immigration has had on the United States. Immigrants have been
highly influential in helping craft United States strategies. Notable foreign-born
Secretaries of State include Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright. Over the course of
United States history twenty foreign born individuals have been appointed to cabinet
positions.152 Additionally, the United States has two foreign born National Security
Advisors, one foreign born Director of the Central Intelligence, one foreign born Director
of National Intelligence, and three foreign born Ambassadors to the United Nations.
Several citizens of the Second Polish Republic who immigrated to the United
States reached positions of influence. Some of these Poles, if counted by birthplace and
not ethnic background, rose through the ranks in the United States military. For example,
Hyman Rickover, “the father of America’s nuclear navy,” and the longest serving sailor in
United States Navy history was born in Poland in 1900. He is one of only four people to
ever win two Congressional Gold Medals. Rickover also won a Presidential Medal of
Freedom. The first foreign-born Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili
was born in Poland in the inter-war era. His father was a Georgian exile who came to
Poland as part of Piłsudski’s attempts to gather nationalists in Poland from various non-
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Russian Soviet ethnicities. Polish exiles, along with other communities such as
Ukrainians, also aided the United States during the Cold War by providing perspective
and intelligence as well as acting as a source of operatives. These examples show how
immigrants can and frequently do reach highly influential positions in the United States
establishment. The individuals who spread Promethean ideas were therefor part of a
larger important immigrant community.
While there have been influential Americans who called for greater Prometheanlike activities, the United States has not adopted the program in full. This is because,
while it is logical for the United States to want to manage Russia’s ability to recreate its
empire, it is dangerous to do so. Robert Gates notes in his memoirs that throughout the
Cold War, State Department reservations prevented full scale support for nationalist
agitation in the Soviet Union and Russia. According to Robert Gates the State
Department argued that “ethnic and nationalist forces were likely to be among the violent
and divisive forces in the world… State also appeared concerned over the relationship of
promoting these divisions to U.S. human rights policy… I must admit State was quite
farsighted in its concerns.” 153 Counsellor of the Department of State Robert Zoellick
during towards the end of the Cold War said that “We do not support the 'break-up' of the
Soviet Union, and I cannot, speculate on the criteria of circumstances under which the
U.S. might 'recognize' the independence of entities that might emerge… there is a
different situation, obviously with the Baltics, whose aspirations for independence we
back.” 154 While there has been some United States support for Chechnya, it has not
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made any difference and fears of terrorist blowback will likely prevent any additional
help in the future. The United States has provided resources to both Ukraine and Georgia
but neither of those nations are in NATO and the United States stepped aside and watched
as Russia took portions of their territories.
There were influential Polish American members in a lobby that called for
Promethean measures to be taken by the United States against the Soviet Union and
Russia but there are other lobbies that shape US foreign policy as well. Henry Kissinger
for one has consistently called for a more measured policy towards the Soviet Union and
Russia. He ushered in the era of Détente when he served under Presidents Nixon and
Ford. Recently in response to the Crimea Crisis of 2014 he has also taken a moderate
stance. 155 Prometheanism was and remains an influential idea in the United States even
though it is not well known but it has not determined the foreign policy of the United
States. United States took approaches other than Prometheanism to contain the USSR and
Russia. Kissinger and others like Stephen Cohen are examples of influential Americans
who do not support a Promethean agenda. Just like in interwar Poland when Piłsudski’s
rivals the National Democrats did not supported Prometheanism, there was and is no
consensus in the United States about continuing with a Promethean agenda.
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CONCLUSION

During the chaotic years after the Russian Revolution as the Bolsheviks attempted
to assert their control over the territory of the Russian Empire, many ethnic groups and
nations declared their independence. Poland, among others, managed to keep their
independence until World War II began. Józef Piłsudski as the leader of the Second
Polish Republic sought to secure Poland’s newly won independence by helping
neighboring nations, such as Ukraine, also break away from Russian control. His efforts
to do so are known as Prometheanism. Using both overt and covert means, Prometheans
attempted to liberate captive nations all across Eurasia. They did not succeed in their
efforts thereby allowing the USSR and Germany to jointly conquer Poland in the first
weeks of World War II in Europe.
The Polish state that backed Prometheanism may have ended in 1939 but the
strategic logic of Prometheanism did not become less relevant. Many of the nationalists
gathered in Poland and Poles who took part in Prometheanism fled to western countries
after the war. These exiles took their experiences and talents with them. In foreign lands
these émigrés modified and adapted the core principles of Prometheanism to the Cold
War era world. Some were able to rise to positions of prominence that allowed them to
influence the foreign policies of the United States and post-communist Poland.
Jerzy Giedroyc was one of the key figures in the survival and transformation of
Prometheanism. In the inter-war years he worked as an editor who helped explain the
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logic of Prometheanism to Poles. After the war he settled in France and began the journal
Kultura. In the pages of this publication he developed a foreign policy orientation that
Poland should follow. Just as the Promethean movement strove for the liberation of
Poland’s eastern neighbors, Kultura’s writers called for Poland to recognize Lithuania,
Belarus, and Ukraine as nations equals to Poland and worthy of independence. According
to Giedroyc, just like in the inter-war years, Poland’s own autonomy would best be
secured after the fall of communism by having a string of nations buffering Poland from
Russia.
Kultura influenced Polish politicians, and as soon as communism fell in Poland
they began to act in the manner called for by Giedroyc and his writers. From 1989—1991
Poland faced many foreign policy challenges. Poland had to manage the withdrawal of
Soviet armed forces and to secure its western border with a soon to be reunited Germany.
On top of these challenges Poland also encouraged the Lithuanian SSR and the Ukrainian
SSR to declare their independence. Polish leaders did this by congratulating any step
those countries took towards declaring themselves to be sovereign states. Even after the
collapse of the Soviet Union Poland still pursued a strategy that resembled
Prometheanism. Poland supported both Ukraine and Georgia when their leaders sought to
orient their nations westward and join the European Union and NATO. Presidents of both
Ukraine and Georgia lauded the aid Poland gave their countries. Prometheanism, or at
least the logic behind it, therefore still animates Polish foreign policy. There is a direct
line of continuity between the program in the interwar years and Polish foreign policy
after 1989.
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The link between Prometheanism and the foreign policy of the United States is
not as strong it is in the case of Poland but it is there. After the onset of the Cold War the
United States needed policies to “contain” the USSR. Some in the United States did not
merely seek to contain the Soviets; they wanted to remove the threat they posed all
together. Since a direct confrontation with the USSR carried the risk of a nuclear
holocaust the United States needed covert ways to undermine the Soviet Union.
Prometheanism fit the bill perfectly. During the Eisenhower administration the United
States declared its support for the liberation of captive nations inside the USSR but this
was mere rhetorical flourish until Zbigniew Brzezinski became President Carter’s
National Security Advisor. He and other Polish Americans called for the United States to
adopt measures much like those of Piłsudski’s Prometheanism. The United States has
taken steps to bring former Soviet Republics into western organizations such as NATO
and therefore out of the Russian sphere of influence. The United States has also provided
some aid to independence movements inside the Russian Federation.
There are several reasons why Prometheanism influenced the foreign policy of the
United States. One is that the strategic goals of the United States, such as limiting
Russian power and influence, are well-served by such a program. Furthermore, due to the
United States’ generally friendly relations with Russia from the Revolutionary War to the
end of World War II, the United States foreign policy establishment did not have much
experience in trying to contain Russia when the Cold War began. There simply was not a
lot of native experience in the United States when it came to managing Eurasia, due to
isolationist policies prior to World War II. East European immigrants helped to fill this
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void and disproportionally shaped the foreign policy of the United States during the Cold
War.
Overall Prometheanism’s record is mixed. On the negative side, Prometheanism
did not save the Second Polish Republic. On the other hand the reformed version of
Prometheanism in the pages of Kultura as carried out by the Polish government in early
years after the fall of communism largely succeeded. The decision to treat Ukraine and
Lithuania as legitimate nations and drop all territorial claims strengthened their hands in
their struggle against Moscow and allowed Poland to have constructive relations with
them. It was and remains a dangerous course of action. Fear of those dangerous outcomes
is why the US never fully committed itself to a Promethean agenda. According to Robert
Gates the State Department argued that “ethnic and nationalist forces were likely to be
among the violent and divisive forces in the world… State also appeared concerned over
the relationship of promoting these divisions to U.S. human rights policy… I must admit
State was quite farsighted in its concerns.” 156 It is important to consider these dangers
when considering the legacy of Prometheanism.
Studying the legacy and evolution of Prometheanism shows how refugees and
immigrants change both the country of origin and the host country. The post-war
evolution of Prometheanism is a powerful example of the Transatlantic exchange at
work. The influx of Polish émigrés into the United States in the 1940s, in time for the
beginning of the Cold War, led to the rise of leaders in the United States who had a
different perspective on the Soviet bloc. These Polish Americans helped to shape the
policies of the United States in profound but sometimes overlooked ways. The Kultura
156

Gates, From the Shadows, 93.
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community and even the career of Ian Brzezinski show how immigration can be viewed
as a two way process and not a one way flow of people. In those cases the ideas that
changed the country of origin were first formulated in other lands.
Prometheanism should be viewed as part of larger history of Polish strategy. It
sprang from long standing Polish policies whose origins can be traced back to the Middle
Ages. Just as Prometheanism did not spring froth from a vacuum after World War I, it did
not fade to nothing after World War II. The government of Poland adopted a modified
version of Prometheanism after the fall of the communist government. This shows that
the foreign policy of the Second Polish Republic was not hopeless and doomed to failure.
The Republic’s strategies required more time to succeed than was available but they were
not foolhardy.
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Figure A.1:

157

A map showing the nations of Central Asia during the time of the
Russian Empire in 1903. 157

John Bartholomew & Co, The XXth Century Citizen’s Atlas of the World (London: George Newnes
Ltd., 1903), 133.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:XXth_Century_Citizen%27s_Atlas_map_of_Central_Asia.png.
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Figure A.2: This map shows the territories of Ukraine in 1918. It also shows the
regions in southern Russia and the Caucasus that broke off before the Bolsheviks
established their authority over the area. The territories of the Don and Kuban
Republics can also be seen although they are not marked as independent
territories. 158

158
“Dismembered Russia — Some Fragments,” The New York Times, February 17, 1918,
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?_r=1&res=9903E1DE113FE433A25754C1A9649C946996D6CF.
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Figure A.3: This map shows the approximate positions of the forces in the Russian
Civil War in 1919. The temporarily independent Don Republic and the Mountain
Republic can be made out on this map. Here the those areas are shown as the
territory north of the British controlled zone in the Caucasus and south of the
Bolshevik controlled territory between the Black and Caspian seas. 159

159

Uploaded by OttomanReference, “File:ApproxPositionsWWI-1919.png - Wikipedia, the Free
Encyclopedia,” Wikipedia, May 5, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ApproxPositionsWWI-1919.png;
Original image by The New York Times, “Military Positions in the March of 1919,” New York Times,
Current History 1919 (Volume X, P. 262), 1919, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ApproxPositionsWWI1919.png.
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Figure A.4: Another map, this one from 1919, showing Ukraine, the Don, Kuban,
Georgia and other temporarily independent countries before the creation of the
Soviet Union. 160

160
MaGioZal, “Europe Map 1919,” Wikipedia, November 3, 2007,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Europe_map_1919.jpg; Based on a map published by the London
Geographical Institute.
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Figure A.5: Poland and Lithuania under the early Jagiellon dynasty. This map
show the territorial extent of the kingdom and grand duchy at the time. Piłsudski
hoped to create a state whose borders resembled the above through the
Intermarrium federation. 161

161
Uploaded by Poznaniak, “Mapa Polski Za Panowania Władysława II Jagiełły (1386 - 1434),” February
7, 2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Polska_1386_-_1434.png; Based on the image found in
Ilustrowany Atlas Historii Polski (Warsaw: Demart, 2006).
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Figure A.6: Symon Petlura leader of the Ukrainian People’s Republic talking with
Polish General Antoni Listowski in 1920 during the Polish-Soviet war and the
height of Polish efforts to free Ukraine from Russian control. 162

162
“Generał Antoni Listowski (pierwszy Z Lewej) Podczas Rozmowy Z Atamanem Semenem Petlurą
(drugi Z Lewej).,” Zbiory NAC on-Line - Prototyp, 1920,
http://audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/61500/1f6c11ec3942555b2fe55abf52ecd754/.
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Figure A.7: Polish tanks taking part in the War for Latvian Independence. Poles
considered this to part of the Polish Soviet War. It also shows how Polish military
aid did help other nations win their independence. 163

163

Unknown, “Polish FT-17 Tanks of the Polish 1st Tank Regiment during the Battle of Dyneburg,”
Wikimedia.org, accessed February 3, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ft17_dyneburg8.jpg.
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Figure A.8:

164

The statue of Prometheus in Tbilisi, Georgia. 164

Vladimer Shioshvili, “Amirani - Georgian Prometheus,” 24 November 2007,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amirani_-_Georgian_Prometheus.jpg.
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